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Abstract 
Political competitions and access to power, in plural societies like Nigeria, takes different 
forms and dimensions. Ethnic pluralism in Nigeria has more often than not been 
characterized by contestations and struggles for access to power and the resources of the 
Nation-State.  Nigeria has therefore become a „cake‟ to be shared among the various 
nationalities, while nobody cares about the baking of the cake.  The ethnic factor which 
initially ignited the demands for States creation has continued to torment the country. Thus, 
ethno-regional interests are usually mobilized to campaign for States creation and 
development and these agitations have been persistent and seemingly endless.  This aim of 
this paper is to argue that the logic of continued States creation in Nigeria, purportedly to 
bring government closer to the people and achieve national development is a failed strategy.  
Again,the history and nature of States creation in Nigeria has failed to assuage the very forces 
that instigate the demands for new States.  The prospects for national development and 
integration as well as local autonomy depend on the emergence of a purposeful, courageous, 
visionary and national leadership.  Besides the leadership question, Nigeria needs a 
repositioned and strengthened local government system, an orientation to enable Nigerians on 
the need for peaceful co-existence and constitutional amendments to ensuring a true Federal 
system where the other levels of government will control a substantial amount of their 
resources. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Nigeria is a plural society with different cleavages – ethnic, religious, cultural, 
linguistic, as well as geo-political, social and economic development – but ethnic 
heterogeneity is inarguably, the most pervasive of them all. The problem ethnicity poses is 
that political competition and access to power is overtly drawn along ethnic lines. Again, 
since Nigerian Federalism is based on ethnic and not geographical diversities, it has tended to 
exacerbate centrifugal forces in the country.  Therefore, the struggle for acquisition and 
access to power in Nigeria has been patterned largely along ethnic lines.  This becomes more 
problematic because the State is not a neutral force in mediating political conflict.  It can be 
captured and used to further the interests of the leadership of an ethnic group or a 
combination of such groups. 
The development of Nigerian Federalism as a dynamic process can best be understood 
with reference to the ethnic configuration in Nigeria.  Over the years, the process has 
involved the creation of more States to reduce political domination at the Federal level by the 
Hausa-Fulani.  It has also involved the attempt by minority ethnic groups to challenge the 
hegemony of the three largest ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo in the political, 
social and economic life of the country, each of which like some of the other ethnic groups, is 
also made up of a number of sub-ethnic groups.
1
 
Thus, there seems to be no limit to the demands for States creation in Nigeria, for as 
long as ethnic chauvinists and political merchants keep agitating for State creation in order to 
solve the alleged marginalization of their people.  It seems irrelevant to these professional 
agitators and political opportunists whether or not their prospective States posses the capacity 
to survive.  To worsen matters, each ethnic group has continuously come to think of itself as 
a distinct entity with interests and demands.  Again, “there has been unabated clamour and 
agitations for the creation of more States to satisfy ethnic nationalism.  While ethnic or 
separatist nationalism grow to the detriment of Nigerian nationalism, there has been a 
growing attitude of antagonisms and lack of trust among Nigerians.”2 
This paper seeks to explore the roots and nature of ethnic politics in Nigeria, 
especially as it relates to the agitation and the actual creation of States to satisfy ethnic 
sentiments.  The paper argues that as a Nigerian people, the various ethnic nationalities need 
to learn to live together rather than clamouring for more States.  This is because the creation 
of more States will multiply the existing problems – ethnic minority issues, lack of 
development, corruption, the bankruptcy of the States and a unitarist federation, therefore, 
adversely affecting the overall growth, development and national integration of the country. 
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2.0 Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
2.1 Ethnic Group 
An ethnic group has been defined as “consisting of interacting members who define 
themselves as belonging to a name or labeled social group with whose interest they identify 
and which manifests certain aspects of a unique culture, while constituting a part of a wider 
society”.3  Again, Okwudiba Nnoli defines ethnic groups as “social formations distinguished 
by the communal character of their boundaries”.4  The relevant communal factor may be 
language, culture or both.  He also emphasized that as social formations, ethnic groups are 
not necessarily homogeneous entities, both linguistically and culturally.  This implies that 
there can be minor linguistic and cultural differences within groups forming the basis for the 
delineation of sub-ethnic systems. Furthermore, ethnic groups may be defined as “categories 
of people characterized by language, value system and normative behavior, and whose 
members are anchored in a particular part of a new State territory”.5  
The above definitions have tended to emphasis on common interests, common 
identity, common language and sentiments, certain general core values, which tend and 
distinguish members of one ethnic group from other groups in the society.  These groups co-
operate and compete with one another in economic, political and social fronts, sometimes 
under well organized group context with leaders playing prominent roles and at other times, 
under less defined organization in which the sense of group is sustained by common interest 
and territoriality. 
 
2.2 Ethnicity 
There have been numerous efforts
6
 in defining what ethnicity is all about.  In Eghosa 
Osaghae‟s view, ethnicity involves “the employment and or mobilization of ethnic identity or 
difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation.”  7 Similarly, 
Okwudiba Nnoli argues that “ethnicity arises when relations between groups are competitive 
rather than co-operative.  It is characterized by cultural prejudice and political 
discrimination.”8  The foregoing definitions imply that ethnicity is neither natural nor 
accidental, but it is the product of a conscious effort by social actors.  It is also evident that 
ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations, but also in the contexts 
of cooperation. 
It therefore follows as Eghosa Osaghae submits that, “ethnic conflicts ensue from 
situations in which people from different ethnic groups decide to employ their ethnic 
differences in pursuing competing interests.”9  In a similar vein, Okwudiba Nnoli sees 
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ethnicity as arising from the desire of individuals to organize themselves in ways to enhance 
their competitive efficiency in a situation where they perceive each other as competing for 
resources and positions.
10
   Thus, political offices and appointments are seen as battle fields 
among the various ethnic groups, where the battles are fought with all available weaponry a 
group can muster. 
 
2.3 Politics 
Politics is a pervasive human endeavour that prevails in all spheres of life that is as 
old as human history. Given the nature and character of politics, it has witness a plethora of 
definitions. Politics has however been defined by Harold Lasswell as an empirical science 
that studies the shaping and sharing of power about “who gets what, when and how.”11 This 
implies that politics extend beyond the realm of State affairs.  It therefore bothers on whether 
power - the main object of politics – is obtained as an end in itself to ensure binding decisions 
or as a means to an end.  Another Political theorist, David Easton, defines politics as the 
persistent pattern of human interaction in a society mainly oriented towards “authoritative 
allocation of values.”12  This indicates that politics has to do with authoritative or binding 
decisions concerning the distribution of State‟s resources. Easton‟s definition suggests that 
once a decision is made, it conveys the idea of legitimacy and binding compulsion.   This 
covers the realm of public politics because resolutions are authoritative within the structures 
of government. 
In a nutshell, politics can be said to refer to all the issues and events that involve the 
struggle for acquisition and use of power and all the benefits and resources it confers.  
Politics, therefore deal with the State and the political society – that is, a people organized for 
law within a definite territory.  
 
2.4 Power 
Since the time of the Greek City-States, political philosophers have focused on 
„power‟ as the key aspect of the political situation. Despite the omnipresence of power in 
political life, political theorists have not reached a widespread agreement on its meaning. 
Political power has, however been defined “as the capacity to affect another‟s behavior by 
some form of sanctions.”13  These sanctions can be in the form of carrot or stick.  In other 
words, the sanctions can be in form of inducement or coercion.  It is a carrot or inducement 
when compliance comes with promises of wealth or honour by leaders to their supporters and 
threat of denial of such rewards to their opponents.  It is coercive when people are compelled 
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to take certain courses of action for fear of application of sanctions or threat.  Power, in this 
sense therefore, implies the ability to compel compliance.  Similarly, the Oxford Concise 
Dictionary of Politics sees power as the ability to make people (or things) do what they would 
not otherwise have done.  The dictionary sees power to be concerned with which groups or 
individuals denominate, get their way or are best able to pursue their interests in societies.
14
 
We can therefore define power as the use of resources – assets and capabilities – to 
secure compliance or conforming conduct of others.  Power is primarily a relationship, for the 
power wielder exercises control over some other persons and resources.  There are several 
dimensions in any power situation.  These include the goals, the means by which resources 
are used and the outcomes.  The type of goals pursued and a society‟s common values will 
affect the outcome of the power situation.  Generally, political power can be regarded as the 
ability to make or carry out binding decisions affecting the whole or large society.  This 
implies that the various ethnic and interest groups clamouring for the creation of new States 
may intend to use that means and the outcomes to be in a position to making binding 
decisions, affecting people and resources. 
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
The theory that best captures and explains the ethnic politics and the politics of States 
creation in Nigeria is the Modern Conflict Theory as propounded by Wright Mills, who is 
called the founder of modern conflict theory.
15
 Conflict theory generally is based on the 
writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.   The theory, as propounded by Wright Mills 
argues that society is not best understood as a complex system striving for equilibrium but 
rather for competition.  It further maintains that society is made up of individuals and groups 
for limited resources, for instance, money, leisure, opposite partners, etc.  Again, broader 
social structures and organizations, like religious, governments etc, reflect the competition for 
resources in their inherent inequalities; some people, groups and organizations have more 
resources – power and influence – and use those resources to maintain their positions of 
power in society. 
Conflict theory was developed to illustrate the limitations of structural – 
functionalism. The structural-functionalist approach argued that society tends towards 
equilibrium, focusing on stability at the expense of social change.  This is contrasted with the 
conflict approach which argues that society is constantly in conflict over resources.
16
 
The main assumptions of the conflict theory are that, first; competition over scare resources is 
at the heart of all social relationships. Competition, rather than consensus is characteristic of 
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human relationships.  Secondly, the theory assumes that inequality in power and reward are 
built into all social structures.  Individuals and groups that benefits from any particular 
structure strive to see it maintained.  Thirdly and lastly, the theory assumes that change 
occurs as a result of conflict between competing interests rather than through adaptation.  It 
insists that change is often abrupt and revolutionary rather than evolutionary.
17
 
A heuristic devise to help us think about society from a conflict perspective is to ask, 
“Who benefits from this element of society”?   Using the same example, we can ask, “Who 
are the main beneficiaries of States creation in Nigeria”?  Who are the actors that campaign 
against ethnic injustice and what are their interests? 
 
3.0  History and Assumptions of States Creation in Nigeria. 
There has been a unanimous view by scholars
18
 that the manipulation of ethnicity by 
the Nigerian elite has its roots in colonialism. As Godwin Hembe submits, “the British 
Colonial Administration in Nigeria was based on policies which tended to encourage ethnic 
consciousness and exclusiveness.”19  According to him, the local administration, which was 
based on indirect rule system, depended on the utilization of pre-colonial institutions, which 
were modified to suit the purposes of colonial ideology.  Similarly, until 1947 Nigerians of 
Northern and Southern regions never had the opportunity to interact as one people.  The 
regionalism of the Richards‟ Constitution was reinforced by the McPherson Constitution of 
1951, and the stage was set for ethno-regional politics.  Consequently, all the political parties 
- National Council of Nigerians and Cameroon (NCNC) in 1944, the Northern People‟s 
Congress (NPC) in 1951 and Action Group (AG) in 1951, formed to contest power had 
clearly defined tribal and ethnic bases.
20
  Giving this background, ethnicity and regionalism 
became the Nigerian political way of life and manipulation of same sentiments, the major 
preoccupation of politicians and the avenue to political power.  It was this development that 
led to minority agitations for self-determination in all the regions during the terminal phase of 
colonial rule.
21
  
Given this background, Nigerian politics is primarily ethnic politics and certain 
primordial identities inevitably determine political affiliations and inter group relations. 
There has therefore, been inter-ethnic rivalry to secure the domination of government by one 
ethnic group or combination of ethnic groups to the exclusion others.
22
 
Ethnicity has therefore, been a re-occurring factor, overtly and even covertly, in the 
State creation exercises in Nigeria. Thus, Obafemi Awolowo, had opined that “ethnicity is the 
major factor to be considered as a criterion in creating any State in a federation so that 
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minority groups in the midst of majority groups who differ in language, culture and historical 
background will not feel inferior.”23 In a similar vein, Nnamdi Azikiwe also recommended a 
number of criteria for State creation based on ethnicity of which both the Federal and State 
governments must be regrouped into various ethnic groups.
24
 
It is important to reiterate that the adoption of Federalism as a form of government 
was the result of social forces at work within the country. As Isawa Elaigwu opines, “it was a 
compromise solution of some of the political problems, which emerged in the terminal period 
of colonial rule.”25 Although Nigeria became a Federal State with 3 regions – Northern, 
Western and Eastern regions, the creation of additional federating units was the result of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces in the country.  
It follows therefore that between 1954 and 1960, the issue of the minorities and their 
place in the emerging new Nigeria dominated the series of Constitutional Conferences that 
were held before independence in 1960. Thus, Sir Henry Willink Commission was instituted 
in 1957 to enquire into the fears of the minorities and suggest the means of allaying them. 
While the Commission found evidence of discrimination and other problems alleged by the 
minorities and acknowledged the genuineness of their fears and anxieties, it rejected the 
creation of additional States particularly because of the difficulty in drawing a clean 
boundary which “does not create fresh minority”, among others.26 The Commission believed 
that the solution to the problem of minorities lay in the political process, rather than the 
creation of separate States for them.
27
 What the minorities got at Independence in 1960 was a 
guarantee of their rights, especially as enshrined in the Independence Constitution. 
In 1963, during the First Republic, the Mid-Western Region was created out of the 
Western Region. It has been argued that the creation of that Region, which was the excision 
of the non-Yoruba, partly Igbo from the Western region did not arise from a genuine concern 
by the nation's leaders for the predicament of the minorities. The reorganization was part of 
vindictive campaign by the ruling Federal coalition parties – the NPC and the NCNC, to 
destroy the main Federal opposition party, the AG, while resolutely resisting the Statehood 
aspirations of the minorities in their respective home regions.
28
 
Furthermore, with the secession bid by the Easterners which followed the 
apprehension and fears of the Igbo after the counter-coups d‟état of July 29 1966, the creation 
on 27
th
 May, 1967 of 12 States from the existing four regions by the Gowon regime was, 
indeed, an attempt to nip the secession bid in the bud.
29
 As submitted by Osaghae, “the 12 
States structure went a long way to allay two principal fears: Minorities‟ fear of oppression in 
the old regions and Southern fears of Northern domination.”30 Thus, by splitting up the old 
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Northern region and creating an equal number of States from the North and South (six each), 
the exercise dealt in  one fell swoop with the basic structural flaw which created so much 
tension in the federation. Moreso, the minorities' fears which historically revolved around 
alleged domination and oppression by the majority groups in the regions were allayed. The 
States were Lagos, Western, Mid- Western, South- Eastern, East-Central, Rivers, Kwara, 
Benue-Plateau, North-Eastern, North-Western, North-Central and Kano. 
This exercise generated more questions than the answers it provided. For instance, the 
advocates for the majority groups saw the minorities as the main beneficiaries of the exercise 
and questioned the implicit attempt to make minorities equal to majorities. They, accordingly, 
demanded more States for the majorities to reflect the population differences.
31
  Another 
problem was the appearance of new minorities and fears of domination. Moreso, Hembe 
posits that the North-Eastern State alone accounted for about 1/3 of the total land area of 
Nigeria, leaving the remaining 2/3 to the other eleven States.
32
 In view of these and other 
complaints and problems, Gowon promised that he would review the whole issue of State 
creation after the war.
33
 This promise heightened the tempo of demands for new States, but 
no concrete effort was taken to review the exercise until he was overthrown in 1975. 
When General Murtala Mohammed overthrew General Gowon, he quickly set up the 
Justice Ayo Irikefe Panel to look into the issue of State creation in the country. The panel 
received about 32 demands for new States. It was based on the memoranda submitted to the 
government by the Panel that the number of States was raised to 19, on 3
rd
 February, 1976. 
The nineteen States were Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Bendel, Cross-River, Anambra, Imo, 
Rivers, Kwara, Benue, Plateau, Borno, Bauchi, Gongola, Sokoto, Niger, Kano and Kaduna. 
The 1976 exercise was implemented in the wake of a phenomenal growth in Federal 
petroleum exports revenue allocation arrangements that enthroned inter-State equality as the 
preeminent standard of financial devolution. An important feature of this exercise was the 
explicit transformation of the rationale for State creation from its original role as a sop for 
ethnic minority fears into a scheme for the dissemination of Central revenue. Thus, in 
addition to being a vehicle for extending political and economic self-governance to distinct 
ethnic communities, States creation became an administrative strategy for the devolution of 
Federal largesse to an amorphous array of territorial communities and coalitions.
34
 
Again, this State creation exercise diluted the viability criterion which had kept down 
the number of States in the past and ensured a measure of fiscal autonomy for existing ones.
35
 
This therefore gave rise to a phenomenal increase in the demand for new States as various 
ethnic groups and elites struggled to maximize their shares of the „national cake‟. 
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Consequently, the Igbo people argued later that a situation where  they had only two States 
(Anambra and Imo) from the 1976 exercise while the Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani, the other 
two majority groups, had about five each, was unjust and unacceptable. Thus, agitation for 
States creation in the country became a contest among majority ethnic groups, struggling to 
square up, more than the struggle of the minorities for self-determination. 
The agitation for more States went unabated during the Second Republic (1979-1983) 
and the demands for new States were so volatile that none was eventually created till the 
collapse of the Republic. As it is well documented,
36
 the attempts to create new States during 
this period were stymied by Constitutional complexities, partisan acrimonies, economic 
uncertainties and unfettered sectional recrimination and suspicion. 
When General Ibrahim Babangida took over power in 1985, the clamour for States 
creation was loud. He therefore set up the Political Bureau, headed by Dr. S.J. Cookey to 
look into the demands by the people for the creation of more States in. It was based on the 
recommendations of the Bureau that the Federal Government in September 1987 created two 
more States – Akwa-Ibom and Katsina – thus, increasing the number of States in the country 
to 21. The Bureau recommended the creation of six new States – Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Katsina, 
Kogi, Sarduana and Wawa.
37
 In creating the two States, General Babangida announced that 
the demands for new States will no longer be tolerated. However, in August, 1991, the 
regime back-paddled and created nine new States to bring the number of States to thirty (30). 
The nine States were Abia, Enugu, Delta, Jigawa, Kebbi, Osun, Kogi, Taraba and Yobe. 
Although the regime justified the creation of more States as the need for balanced 
federation, bringing government nearer to the people, even development, etc, “the 1991 
exercise was largely intended to galvanize support for the regime, whose strength was ebbing 
and to compensate close allies.”38 Again, the demand by the Constituent Assembly for the 
creation of new States; the abortive coup of 1990 which had marginalization of the Middle-
Belt and Southern minorities as a major issue;
 
and the vigorous campaigns for ethnic justice 
in States creation
39
 also contributed.  
The agitations for States creation seemed to have doubled when General Sani Abacha 
came to power in 1993. Thus, following the recommendations of the National Constitutional 
Conference (NCC) on the need to create more States, General Abacha set up a Committee for 
States creation, Local Government and boundary adjustment, headed by Arthur Mbanefo.  
The Committee received a total of 85 requests for new States.
40
 Thus, on the occasion of the 
Country's 36
th
 Independence Anniversary on 1
st
 October, 1996, General Abacha announced 
the creation of six new States. The new States retained the old principle of North and South 
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divide and were spread equally across the six geo- political zones into which the country was 
divided for the purpose of rotational presidency. The States were Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Ekiti, 
Gombe, Nasarawa and Zamfara. 
The last exercise brought the number of constituents units in the Nigerian Federation 
to 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory, and 774 Local Government Areas.  Yet, there 
are more agitations for new States in Nigeria. The question remains whether the continuous 
balkanization of Nigeria into smaller, weaker and unviable units has actually brought 
government, or power as well as development closer to the people.  
 
4.0 The Politics of more States in Nigeria 
There have been continuous calls for more States in Nigeria, as the National 
Assembly prepares to amend the 1999 Constitution. The agitators for more States argue that 
States creation will bring development closer to the door-steps of many Nigerians. Emeka 
Esogbue maintains that “creation of more States has brought development economically to 
the door steps of many towns and cities, many of which have been labeled, as capital cities or 
headquarters.
41
 He submits further that with the creation of more States the scope of political 
development will be widened to accommodate 36 Governors, 36 Houses of Assembly, more 
legislators, more State High Courts, more police officers, etc. He also assert that more States 
will also see to the siting of the headquarters of several Parastatals, Ministries, Federal and 
State Universities as well as other modern developmental structures like Airports, Banks etc. 
The agitators for States creation also maintain that such an exercise will create an 
opportunity for the marginalized people or ethnic groups to have access to power. In their 
argument, the Federal Executive Council is rested on the number of States in existence, and 
that most times decisions are democratically reached by the body through votes. This will 
therefore give some regions or ethnic groups more weight in their bargain for the allocation 
of values. They also maintain that by creating new bureaucracies, it will give mass 
employment to youths and other qualified graduates. Since the inception of his tenure as the 
Senate President of the National Assembly in 2007, Senator David Mark has not left anyone 
in doubt about his desire to increase the number of States in the country through the creation 
of more States.
42
 This has no doubt renewed the hope of agitators for creation of new States. 
The agitations for new States in the present democratic dispensation (1999 till date) 
reached a crescendo in 2005 during the inconclusive National Political Reform Forum 
convened by the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 – 2007). In 
that Conference, the Igbo delegates from the South East who feel short-changed by the 
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present structure in the country had gone to the Conference with the creation of an additional 
State for the zone as its main agenda.
43
 In their argument, the South-East has only five States 
against six States in the South-West, South-South, North-Central, North-East and North-
West, which has seven. Although this dream did not materialize in that Conference, it has not 
doused the demand of the zone for at least one additional State in the spirit of fair play and 
equity. 
Today, it is not only the South-East that wants more States. At a Conference in Lagos 
recently, the Deputy Senate President, Senator Ike Ekweremadu hinted that, the demands for 
additional States now stands at forty-five. He also pointed that “ethnic minority fears, search 
for equity and speedy developments as well as quest for political empires and influence by 
the elite are key factors determining the clamour for more States”. According the Deputy 
Senate President the country would become a federation of 81 States, should all the requests 
be granted.
44
 
Furthermore, the creation of States has always being influenced by political rather 
than developmental considerations. For instance, the creation of the Mid-Western State in 
1963 was done out of the conspiracy by the coalition government of NPC/NCNC to divide 
the opposition AG's stronghold. The creation of 12 States by Gowon was also believed to 
have been motivated by the desire to whittle the influence of the then Governor of Eastern 
Region, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu at the height of hostilities between the Region and the 
Federal Government. In the subsequent exercises, the struggle for access to the „national 
cake‟ has been the main consideration in the creation of States. In many cases, champions 
push for creation of new States for their people, not because the people are in support of such 
moves, but because they want political freedom for themselves or they want to prove a point 
to their political opponents.
45
 
Although the National Assembly has been inundated with demands for more States, it 
is important to reiterate here that there is no evidence in Nigeria to suggest any correlation 
between States creation and economic, infrastructure and human capital development. What 
we have is increased looting of the nation's treasury.
46
 The implication of additional States is 
therefore that more Governors, Commissioners, Special Advisers, Permanent Secretaries will 
be created, all feeding fat on the national treasury. Besides, government bureaucracy will thus 
have to be created in the new States with attendant costs.  
Besides, State creation in Nigeria remains entirely an elite affair. It is an enterprise 
controlled, prosecuted and employed by the elite for the satisfaction of elite desire for power 
and relevance and all the appurtenances that go with that.
47
 This is why since 1963; States 
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creation has not been a basis for resolving the national question and the attendant problem of 
mass alienation from the political and economic processes of the nation. What has aggravated 
this arrant lack of effectiveness is that there does not exist an objective set of criteria for State 
creation in Nigeria. Besides, “State creation has become an instrument of political patronage 
and one designed to enhance the competitive edge of particular tendencies or regimes that 
become dominant at different points in the historical trajectory.”48 Thus, the absence of a 
clearly defined criteria States for creation has left the door open for a continuous clamour for 
creation of new States. 
Furthermore, States creation has not only failed to solve the problem of ethnic 
minorities or even the ethnic majorities, but it has also become a veritable tool with which a 
string of unitarist leaders have dealt a fatal blow to the Nigerian Federalism.
49
 In other words, 
successive Nigerian leaders, driven by the desire to privatize political power with the  
attendant primitive accumulative tendencies, have systematically undetermined the structure 
of the Nigerian Federal system by creating States in an exercise designed as it were to 
weaken the so- called federating units, vis-a-vis the central government. Again, “with State 
creation assuming the role of the panacea for the solution of virtually all socio-economic and 
political problems in Nigeria, it would be expected that there would be a rapid increase in the 
demands for States creation with dangerous consequences or implications for Nigerian 
Federalism.”50 
It is the concern and worry of many Nigerians that most of the present 36 States in 
Nigeria are economically unviable. As the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Malam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi revealed at a public function in Benin recently, most of the 
States are spending about 96% of their revenue in paying civil servants' wage bills.
51
 He 
lamented that “we have created States and other structures that are economically unviable and 
the result is that we do not have funding for infrastructure, education, health and so on. The 
unviable status of the extant States has therefore vitiated the argument for more States. 
Almost all States depend on the federation Account to survive, and this dependent nature of 
States makes them subordinate to the Federal centre and negates the Federal principle of local 
autonomy. 
Again, Williams Ehwarieme
52 
notes that because of the large number of sharing units 
and the lack of independent sources of revenue, the dependence of these units on the Federal 
government has not only virtually impinged on their autonomy but it has hindered their 
capacity to carry out independent development. Moreover, reduction in land space is by 
implication, a drastic reduction in the economic power and activities of the States. Similarly, 
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addressing the effect of incessant State creation on the autonomy of the State and true fiscal 
Federalism in Nigeria, former Vice President Alex Ekwueme observes that, “the increase in 
the number of States has tended to reduce the States to a level where they have virtually 
ceased to function as component, autonomous and cognate units in a Federal polity”. 
It is the opinion of many critics that Nigeria does not need more States. There are 
many federations with higher populations, larger land mass, ethnic and other diversities, 
higher (GDP) and higher internally generated revenue by the federating units, yet, have less 
States than Nigeria. This can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of some Federations in Comparison with Nigeria 
Country Land Mass (sq 
KM) 
Population Number of 
States  
GDP in million $ 
USA 9,826,630 308,724,650 50 14,657,800 
INDIA 3,156,596 1,147,995,900 28 1,729,010 
CHINA 9,571,300 1,330,044,600 22 5,878,629 
CANADA 9,984,670 33,679,263 13 1,574,052 
AUSTRALIA 7,682,300 20,600,856 8 924,843 
RUSSIA 17,075,200 140,702,090 86 1,479,819 
NIGERIA 923,768 162,471,000 36 193,669 
BRAZIL 8,547,404 191,908,600 26 2,051,412 
SOURCE: Encarta, 2009; and World Development Database, World Bank, 2011. 
 
If Nigeria were a federating unit in the United States of America, she (Nigeria) would 
have been the 25
th
 State, in the ranking of the US States by their GDP after Louisiana, whose 
GDP is $ 213,600, while Nigeria‟s own as a country is $193,669. Nigeria‟s GDP is less than 
5% of the US national GDP. 
    
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Ethnicity among other socio-political issues has a lot of implications for the Nigerian 
project. The struggle among ethnic groups to have access and control resources in Nigeria 
nearly delayed the country‟s independence due to the fear of domination expressed by the 
different ethnic groups.  It is this struggle among the various ethnic groups that led to the 
struggle for States creation in Nigeria.  The struggle which began before independence has 
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continued unabated, despite the balkanization of the country into thirty- six (36) States from 
the initial three (3) regions. 
The creation of States to satisfy parochial and patrimonial needs will not move the 
country forward.  States creation is not, in the least, a solution to the myriad of problems the 
country is facing.  Previous exercises have never been done from the perspective of bringing 
government and development closer to the people.  Rather, it has been to score some political 
goals and satisfy particular interests. Again, experience has shown that States creation in 
Nigeria over the years has not brought about the desired or expected effects. There has been 
no sustainable development in the States, the structures are unviable, dependent on the 
Federal Government and have become dens of corruption and underdevelopment. 
What the country needs is a transformational, visionary and courageous leadership. It is 
evident that the creation of new States is an uncreative means of dealing with the aspects of 
national development. The creation of States is therefore not a solution to the problems of 
development and democracy in Nigeria. Rather, the exercise will create opportunities and 
developments which will liberate new forces and threw up more challenges.  
The present Federal structure in the country is unitarist.  Nigeria runs a system of 
government that grants near absolute power to the Federal Executive. We therefore 
recommend a Constitutional amendment and efforts that will ensure true Federalism, rather 
than creating unviable and dependent States.  Again, the States should be allowed to control 
up to 50% of their resources.  This will reduce the number of agitations for new States 
because many of the proposed new States have no economic basis to sustain themselves, 
except their dependence of Federal revenue. It will also encourage States to look inward for 
internally generated revenue by diversifying the economy. 
Again, the continued agitations for the creation of more States are simply an easiest 
way of having access to power and wealth.  To actually get the government and development 
to the people, there is need to reposition the Local Government, which is the closest tier of 
government to the grassroots.  For now, the Local Governments are operating under the 
strangulating control of State Governors.  They are centers of corruption and mediocrity.  The 
powers and functions of the Local Government system should be enshrined in the 
Constitution and their finances ensured. 
One of the reasons for an endless clamour for more States is the cry of 
marginalization by some purported minorities.  Yet Nigerian is a heterogeneous State of more 
than 374 ethnic groupings.  If every dominated and/or marginalized group wants a State of its 
own as a solution to its problems, how many States will Nigerian have?  The State and 
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Federal Government authorities should therefore create structures and make provisions for 
peaceful co-existence among the various groupings in the country.  There should be 
Constitutional arrangements which will guarantee the rights of all nationalities, especially, 
the rotation of elective offices among the various nationalities. 
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